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ABSTRACT 
Succession Rules and Leadership Rents  
by Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas * 
Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in 
order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how 
succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the 
resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two 
regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera 
regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader 
once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters 
receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters 
have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. Leaders, 
then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every 
supporter has veto power over his leadership. 
 
Keywords: Political leadership, political support, political survival, successorship 
JEL Classification: D72, D74, H50, N40 
                                                 
*  Konrad gratefully acknowledges financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG 
grant SFB-TR 15). We thank Florian Engelmaier, Vimal Kumar, Dan Kovenock, Wolfgang 
Leininger and the participants of the CEPR workshop on "crime and conflict" and of the 
research seminar at the University of Munich for constructive comments. The usual caveat 
applies. 
 
 
 iv 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Nachfolgeregeln und die Verteilung von Renten aus Herrschaft 
Könige und Diktatoren, aber auch die Vorstände von Unternehmen und Partei-
vorsitzende verdanken den Fortbestand ihrer Herrschaft der Unterstützung 
einer Gruppe von einflussreichen Helfern in Schlüsselpositionen. Diese können 
ihren Einfluss für, aber auch gegen den Fortbestand der bestehenden 
Herrschaft einsetzen und werden von den Herrschenden in der Regel für ihre 
Loyalität bezahlt. Wir untersuchen, welchen Einfluss bestimmte, in der Realität 
praktizierte Nachfolgeregelungen auf die Machtverteilung zwischen Herrschern 
und ihren Gefolgsleuten haben und wie diese Nachfolgeregeln die Verteilung 
der Vorteile und Renten aus Herrschaft beeinflussen. Wir vergleichen zwei 
unterschiedliche Regime der Nachfolgeregelungen: Das so genannte Konklave-
Regime und das divide-et-impera-Regime. Die beiden unterscheiden sich darin, 
welche Rolle den Gefolgsleute des alten Herrschers im Zusammenhang mit der 
Neubesetzung des Amts des Herrschers und der Schlüsselpositionen der 
Unterstützer unter dem neuen Herrscher zukommt. Der Nutzen des Herrschers 
ist höher und Gefolgsleute erhalten im divide-et-impera-Regime einen 
geringeren Anteil an den Renten, die mit der Herrschaft einher gehen, da sie 
um die Nachfolge härter kämpfen, weil sie im Zuge des Herrschaftswechsels 
mehr zu verlieren haben. Daher sind Herrscher bestrebt, das divide-et- impera-
Regime einzuführen. 
1 Introduction
Any leader depends on supporters to perform his role and stay in power. Sup-
porters are also possible challengers and potential successors to an existing
leader. Knights and soldiers who protected their king with their arms could
also use these very resources to overthrow and succeed him. Powerful mem-
bers of the elite or of the inner circle of political parties in democracies lend
their power to the current party leader, but sometimes they withdraw their
support and try to become the new party leader. Similar relationships exist in
private organizations between chief executive oﬃcers and other executives and
managers lower in a firm’s hierachy. To maintain their position, then, leaders
have to find the right balance and compensate their supporters suﬃciently so
that the temptation to overthrow remains low.
In this paper we examine the relationship between the supporters in the
process of leadership succession for the stability of an incumbent leader’s rule
and his leadership rents. We concentrate on outcomes in which the leader is
successful in retaining leadership over a long period and compare the roles
of two diﬀerent succession regimes for these outcomes. The two succession
regimes that we analyze are the divide-et-impera regime and the conclave
regime.
In the divide-et-impera regime, once the leader has been expelled from
oﬃce, the former supporters will compete for the new leader’s position and
all losers will also lose their positions as supporters of the new leader. The
enactment of “fratricide law” by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror in
the Ottoman Empire is a possibly extreme example of divide-et-impera as a
succession rule:1
Whichever of my sons inherits the sultan’s throne, it behooves
him to kill his brothers in the interest of the world order. Most
of the jurists have approved this procedure. Let action be taken
accordingly.
(quoted in Babinger, 1978, p.66)
A similar rule governing succession appears during the Mauryan empire in
India:2
1Mehmed the Conqueror enacted the law after he himself killed all his brothers. Suc-
ceeding Sultans continued the practice.
2This empire was instituted right about the time of Alexander the Great’s death and
1
Not only is [King Ashoka] said to have killed all rival claimants
to the throne, notably ninety-nine of his brothers, but also to have
paid a visit to hell so that he could construct on earth something
similar, equipped with the very latest in instruments of exquisite
torture, for all who incurred his displeasure.
Keay (2000, pp.90-91)
Less extreme examples in which losing challengers lose at least some of the
previous privileges and property have been common. Examples range from
the Roman empire with civil war between Octavianus and Augustus following
the death of Julius Caesar, with the struggles among other prospective Roman
emperors, up to the behavior of many rulers in modern times.
The second type of succession rule we consider is the conclave regime. As
suggested by its name, this is the principle applied by the Roman Catholic
church, in which the conclave of the cardinals elects one of its members as
the new pope, and all others who are not elected stay on as cardinals to the
new pope. Hence, the two regimes diﬀer with respect to the role of former
supporters who fail to become leaders once the old leader is replaced. This is
perhaps a more modern, and less brutal, regime of succession that limits the
loses of the losers in a succession struggle.
We find that the compensation that is needed to sustain leadership made by
the leader is lower if supporters of the former ruler cannot become supporters
of the successor. Hence, the leader gains if he manages to split up the groups of
supporters and installs the divide-et-impera regime.3 Mehmed the Conqueror’s
rationale for the fratricide law might well have been “in the interest of world
order,” as the quote above states. But, as we show in this paper, it was also
unlikely to have been against the material interests of the Sultan himself. In
covered much of northern India. King Ashoka became the first king to promote Buddhism,
something which represents a significant turn from his early ruthlesness.
3The principle or strategy of divide-et-impera, or divide-and-rule, has often been em-
ployed in history both by individual rulers towards potential adversaries and by imperial
states towards conquered or vassal states. Nowadays autocratic rulers as well as leaders of
organizations are sometimes said to employ the same principle or strategy of hierarchical
governance. The employment of the strategy is typically associated with the collective action
problems that potential challengers might have in allying against the ruler and the instru-
ments of control the ruler might have — bribes, threats, promises, cajoling — in making that
problem worse. (For models that examine this aspect of the strategy, see Weingast, 1997,
or Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2004.) Note that we highlight a diﬀerent, potentially
important aspect of this principle, in the context of leadership succession.
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particular, we show how such a succession rule induces greater rents to the
leader than the more tame alternative, the conclave regime, does.
In the setting we examine, the rents received by the leader depend on
how much he would have to compensate (or bribe) his supporters who are also
potential challengers. The lower the compensation that has to be paid to them,
the higher are the leader’s own rents. That compensation can be expected to
depend on the alternatives his supporters have, with the main alternative being
overthrowing the leader and engaging in a succession struggle against the other
members of the group. We describe the succession struggle as a costly contest
(see, e.g., Hirshleifer, 1995). The cost of the contest is higher under divide-et-
impera than it is under the conclave regime. That property, along with the
probability of the very bad outcome of the loss under divide-et-impera, makes
that regime not as attractive for challengers and, therefore, the leader does
not have to compensate the supporters as much as under the conclave regime.
The two succession rules we examine are extremes that allow for a range
of intermediate cases and for gradual shifts over time to occur. The develop-
ment of the feudal system as discussed by Stephenson (1941) and Bloch (1964,
pp. 163-175, and pp. 190-210) illustrates such a gradual shift (although our
purpose is not to explain such a shift). In the early periods of feudalism, the
enfeoﬀment was an act of will in which a newly elected king selected his sup-
porters and endowed them with the economic and military power and duty to
support him and defend his kingdom. In this early phase the fief [feudum] was
not inheritable. It was a promise between two persons that, given the lack of
external enforcement, had to be self-enforcing. The fief was a payment for ser-
vice, and was to be returned if the service was not delivered. In any case, the
fief ended with the death of the king or his vassal. In this format, the feudal
system was similar to the divide-et-impera regime, except that supporters had
a non-zero probability of being re-installed in their position by a subsequent
king.
In parallel with the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, and in the
centuries that followed, the feudal system changed and elements more similar
to the conclave regime became stronger. The fiefs became hereditary in the
Holy Roman Empire (Bloch 1964, p. 192, pp. 197-199) but the hereditary
principle did not apply automatically for the throne. In the very late stage
a small group of seven princes formed the electorate. In the 15th and 16th
century they chose a new emperor and even sold their votes. Moreover, the
new emperor was not in a position to question their future roles as electorate
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princes and owners of large territories. Notably, this change should go along
with a change in the shares in the rent from governance, where the king’s share
reduced and that of the princes increased.
Our analysis is related to a number of studies which discuss the relationship
between leaders and supporters, or incumbent leaders and rival opposition.
Most obviously, it is related to the ‘logic of political survival’ analyzed by
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). They focus on a (peaceful) game between
two players each of whom would like to become the political leader, and,
for this purpose, try to form winning coalitions from the set of supporters.
For studying the specific role of ‘dividing up the group of supporters’ in the
context of leadership we choose a more narrow framework as we consider and
compare only two modes describing the process of succession of power and do
not consider issues such as the optimal redundancy of power coalitions and
coalition formation. On the other hand, we remove the dividing line between
players who are, or can become, leaders and the group that can grant power
to the leader. Most importantly, we explicitly consider the transaction cost
of the struggle for leadership that is looming when the incumbent leader is
eliminated, i.e., the explicit and resource wasteful struggle in which a new
leader is determined.
Political leaders usually rely on a number of instruments to secure their
continued leadership, and rivalry among the supporters is only one among
many tools. We concentrate on this instrument and disregard many other
mechanisms that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, we
assume that the set of supporters is just suﬃcient to lend power to the leader,
i.e., we give each supporter full veto power. As discussed, e.g., in Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2002, 2003), leaders may rely on redundancy of support and
choose supermajorities of supporters, such that each single supporter has no
veto power. The benefit of such supermajorities is that it reduces the leader’s
exposure to the threats of some supporter groups, as it requires alliances among
several supporters to remove him from oﬃce.4 The cost of redundancy is that a
challenger can overthrow the incumbent by buying the support of a coalition of
4The rationale for supermajorities has also explored in the context of voting by Groseclose
and Snyder (2000). Dal Bo (2000) shows in a related context that an agenda setter who
does not face any competition and makes a proposal to, say, 2n+1 voters can oﬀer contracts
to each and every single voter such that he gets unanimous support for whatever policy,
whether it is prefered by the voters or not. The idea there is based on supermajorities, and,
essentially, making the voters coordinate on an equilibrium by which they all think they
cannot influence the outcome and then simply all vote for the equilibrium outcome.
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supporters that is smaller than the supporting group of the incumbent leader.
As their analysis shows, this is a complex and interesting matter with far
reaching implications and explanatory power, but it is not closely related to
the mechanics of dividing and ruling that we focus on. Similarly, leaders may
try to tie their supporters’ own power to that of the leaders, or to make it
costly for members of their supporting groups to expel them from leadership,
and, indeed, such devices will be useful for the leader and increase his rent
as the incumbent leader.5 However, it will increase clarity and brevity of our
analysis if these aspects are disregarded.
Our analysis is also closely related to a number of contributions studying
wasteful military conflicts. Azam and Mesnard (2003) analyze the causes for
civil war in a setting in which the government (leader) bribes the rival for
not challenging his leadership. Azam (2002) also considers the transfers that
are needed to prevent a leader and his opposition from entering into a waste-
ful conflict. The absence of the set of supporters who grant power makes it
impossible to study the divide-et-impera principle in his framework. On a
broader level our analysis is linked to the literature on eﬃcient contracting in
the shadow of potential war. As has been argued forcefully e.g., by Fearon
(1995), the major cause of actual violence is incompleteness of contracting.
In our context, wasteful conflict can be avoided by an implicit contract in a
fully non-cooperative environment. But the payoﬀs emerging in the actual
conflict will then become relevant determinants for the outcome of the pay-
ment arrangements. From a structural point of view, our analysis is related
to Mehlum and Moene (2002) who study struggles for power as contests and
peace treaties as tacit collusion. In our framework the willingness of a sup-
porter to replace the current ruler and to enter into a power struggle is guided
by an arbitrage condition in which the supporter weighs the benefits of con-
tinued support for the leader against the expected benefits from entering into
a struggle for taking over leadership.
5Mehlum and Moene (2004), for instance, make the point that incumbents may have
developed tools to make it more diﬃcult to overthrow them, and argue that this will have
both a discouragement eﬀect for challengers, as it is more diﬃcult to overthrow the incum-
bent ruler, and an encouragement eﬀect, if a successful challenger inherits the incumbency
advantage of the previous leader, because the incumbency advantage then increases the prize
that the contestants struggle for.
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2 The basic setting
Consider a hypothetical country with the following governance structure. The
country is ruled by a leader. The leader who is in power at the beginning
of a period t is denoted D(t). The leader receives his power from a group
S(t) ≡ {s1(t), ...sn(t)} of supporters si(t), with n a finite number and n ≥ 2.
There is also a set of ‘subjects’ who constitute the set K. Their number is
very large (uncountable). The main purpose of their existence in our context
is to constitute a pool of individuals from which the group of supporters can
be replenished if, for some reason, this becomes necessary.
The period game. In each period the following game takes place. The
leader makes a (binding) promise about a payment that he will make to each
single supporter in the given period, and these promised payments are denoted
a1(t), ...an(t). Once this promise is made, each of the supporters makes a
decision about whether he will support D’s leadership in this period, or not.
If all supporters agree, then the leader runs the government machinery and
this generates some tax revenue G(t) that is normalized to be constant over all
periods and equal to G(t) ≡ 1. The payments are made from this revenue. We
do not consider where exactly this revenue from governance comes from, and
take this amount as given, provided that an uncontested leader and, hence, a
functioning government exists in this period. A leader who had the support
of the group of members of S in period t will also continue to be in oﬃce at
the beginning of period t+ 1 (if there is such a next period).
However, if one or more than one member of S(t) decides to disagree with
the transfers and objects to the ensuing allocation, this will automatically, and
without any cost, remove the current ruler from oﬃce. The ruler will simply
disappear, for instance, because he will be killed or expelled, and will have
zero payoﬀ for all future periods. The possible governance rent G(t) will also
be sacrificed for this period, as there is no leader and, hence, no functioning
government in this period. Summarizing,
G(t) =
½
1 if all i ∈ S(t) agree to the payment oﬀer
0 if at least one i ∈ S(t) disagrees. (1)
Moreover, the problem of finding a new leader and establishing a new
government must be addressed in the respective period t, if there is such a next
period. We assume that the candidates for leadership will be the members
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of the set S(t) and a competition will emerge about who becomes the new
leader. The new leader will be installed at the beginning of period t+ 1. The
mechanism that determines the new leader and the new group of supporters
is central to our analysis. Once the struggle for leadership has started, each
single member of S may start exerting influence activities, actively campaign,
or engage in civil war activities in trying to become the new leader. The
struggle for leadership can take very diﬀerent forms. But the political economy
literature provides a simple and general tool to adequately map such processes.
The tool is a contest technology that is described by a contest success function
that has been applied and used in the context of various conflict situations6:
all i ∈ S(t) may exert eﬀort xi(t) ≥ 0, respectively, and contestant i wins this
contest and becomes the new leader with probability
pi(t) =
(
(xi(t))r?j=n
j=1 (xj(t))
r if
Pj=n
j=1 xj(t) > 0
1/n otherwise,
(2)
where r ≤ 1 measures the eﬀectiveness of additional eﬀort. For r = 0, the
succession becomes a pure random mechanism that gives all candidates the
same probability, irrespective of eﬀort. For r = 1, (2) describes a mechanism
which is known as the lottery contest.7
We also have to define the rules how the set S is replenished as an outcome
of appointing a new ruler. We consider a static environment requiring that
there are n supporters for keeping a leader in oﬃce and enabling him to acquire
the period rents. The replenishment rule of S in case of a leadership change
will be central to the analysis in this paper, and we will distinguish between
two regimes.
In the conclave regime the supporters of the current leader are willing
and able to support the new leader as well, even though there was a conflict
among them about who will become the new leader. In this regime all former
supporters who did not win the contest simply stay on as supporters, and the
n-th supporter slot is simply recruited from the set K. The prototype for this
6See, e.g., Tullock (1980) for a first application in the rent-seeking context, Skaperdas
(1992) and Hirshleifer (1995) for appropriation contests in anarchy, Skaperdas and Grofman
(1995) for campaigning in electoral conflict, Bester and Konrad (2004) for struggles for
leadership in the political arena, Farmer and Pecorino (1999) for an analysis of litigation,
and Müller and Wärneryd (2001) for applications in the context of corporate governance.
7The lottery contest describes win probabilities that are obtained by the following random
mechanism: each unit of a contestant’s eﬀort buys one lottery ticket, where all lottery tickets
of all contestants are put together and the winning ticket is randomly drawn from them.
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succession regime is the governance structure of the Roman Catholic Church
that operates once the pope has died: the members of the group of cardinals
lobby for being elected. There all remain cardinals once the new pope is
elected, and the group of cardinals is replenished by the current pope. As
with most leadership structures, however, the redundancy principle is applied
by the leader such that no single cardinal can force the pope to retreat. One
could perhaps complete the picture, however, by pointing out that a number
of popes have had sudden, mysterious, and suspicious deaths, hinting at a
possible, but drastic means of withdrawal of support.8
The second regime will be called the divide-et-impera regime. In this regime
the supporters to the incumbent ruler are not on friendly terms with each other.
Instead, they are opposed to each other and would actually never be willing to
support one of the other supporters if one of them should manage to become
the new leader. Accordingly, once n− 1 supporters of the former leader have
lost the contest for becoming the new leader, they will also be disposed of by
the new leader, and the leader will replenish the required set of supporters
with n persons from the set K.
The war between Octavianus and Augustus is an example of a situation
in which the divide-et-impera principle was in place. It was clear that neither
of them was willing to submit to the other and to become a supporter of
the other’s leadership. The fight could have only one winner and the loser
lost everything. As mentioned in the introduction, the succession struggles for
most of the Ottoman empire’s history is a more systematic example. Each new
Sultan would kill all his brothers, including half-brothers, for otherwise they
would pose a threat to his leadership. In addition, members of the Sultan’s
cabinet, including the Grand Vezier (the equivalent of a prime minister), when
dismissed would often lose their considerable property and sometimes their
lives.
Finally, we need to specify the objective functions of all players. For sim-
plicity, all individuals only care about monetary payoﬀs, have the same dis-
count factor δ, and their possible contest eﬀorts xi(t) are also expressed in
terms of money of the respective period in which the eﬀorts are made.
The setup is fully non-cooperative. However, we assume that the leader
can commit to fulfilling his promise to pay ai(t) in period t. The precise
mechanism behind this commitment will not be analyzed here, but much like
8As a side remark to this, even in a twentieth century case, the pathology tools available
were not used to investigate a mysterious death of a pope.
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in non-cooperative bargaining, we assume that, once all players agree in a
given period, the payments agreed in this period actually take place, without
further quarrels. We rule out cooperative arrangements by which the leader is
eliminated and all supporters collude and choose a simple lottery for appointing
the successor, because such arrangements need enforcement that is unavailable
in this context. For the same reason, bilateral contracts among the individuals
in S who try to negotiate contingent contracts about what will happen if one
or other of them wins the contest, or any agreements across periods, are not
feasible.
This structure of period play repeats for T periods, with period T being
the last and final period.9
The final period. Apart from the diﬀerent histories that lead to the last
period T , this period has the same structure for both the divide-et-impera
regime and for the conclave regime. It consists of a simple cake-eating problem:
the current leader D(T ) oﬀers some division of the cake a(T ) ≡ (a1(T ), ...
an(T ), 1−
Pi=n
i=1 ai(T )) in which 1−
Pi=n
i=1 ai(T ) is the leader’s own share, and
the supporters simultaneously and independently decide whether to accept or
reject this oﬀer. Note that the set of all feasible a is the simplex σn+1, i.e., the
set of all vectors with all components being non-negative and adding up to 1.
The independence of the supporters’ choices, together with the fact that
unanimity is required for a to be accepted, generates a whole continuum of
equilibria:
Proposition 1 In both the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime
any vector a ∈ σn+1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation in the last
period T .
Proof. For a proof we show that any particular a ∈ σn+1 can be supported
as an equilibrium by appropriate beliefs. Note that supporter i may base his
decision to accept or reject the payment oﬀer not only on the basis of the
component ai, but on the basis of the full vector a, and on the basis of his
beliefs about other supporters’ decisions. Let players have the following beliefs
about the behavior of others: (i) the leader thinks that at least one supporter
9One could also consider games with infinite horizon. Note, however, that we have a set
of players that is finite in each period but potentially infinite over time, which creates some
technical problems.
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will reject any a0 6= a but that all supporters will accept a. (ii) each follower
thinks that at least one other follower will object to any vector a0 6= a, but
that all other supporters will agree to a. Now consider the optimal replies,
given these beliefs.
Consider first supporter i in the acceptance/rejection stage. If a is oﬀered,
given the beliefs of the behavior of others, i expects to be pivotal, and will
receive ai if he accepts and 0 if he rejects. Hence, to accept is an optimal
reply, and it is even strictly better than to reject if ai > 0. Hence, given these
beliefs, an oﬀer a will be accepted. If a0 6= a is oﬀered, i expects that at least
one other supporter will not agree to the payments oﬀered. But as stated in
(1), this reduces i’s payoﬀ to zero, no matter whether i is willing to agree to
the payments vector a0 or not. Given this indiﬀerence, i may choose to reject
a0 as well.
If all supporters follow this behavior, all followers will unanimously agree
to a but unanimously reject a0 6= a, and this confirms the beliefs in (i) and (ii)
above.
We turn now to the leader. Given his beliefs about the acceptance/rejection
subgame among supporters for given oﬀers, the leader anticipates that a will
be accepted if oﬀered, and any a0 6= a will be rejected. Accordingly, the
leader’s payoﬀ is equal to 1 −
Pi=n
i=1 ai(T ) if he oﬀers a, and zero otherwise.
Hence, unless
Pi=n
i=1 ai(T ) > 1 for this oﬀer a, the leader’s optimal choice is to
oﬀer this a.
What makes the problem in Proposition 1 diﬀerent from the standard
ultimatum game and yields these equilibria is that several, not just one, players
must simultaneously agree to an oﬀer. This generates a coordination problem
among the supporters and a set of equilibrium outcomes is supported that is
similar to undesirable voting equilibria in which the least preferred candidate
may win: if the leader oﬀers the “wrong” vector of payments, the supporters
may think that other supporters will challenge the leader. But then, their
own decision whether to challenge the leader becomes a matter of indiﬀerence
to them, and they may as well refuse the payment and challenge the leader.
Hence, for payment vectors oﬀered other than the “right” vector, there will
be an equilibrium where all will challenge the payment vector that is oﬀered,
and this, in turn, is suﬃcient for the leader not to oﬀer such other payment
vectors.
Note that the unanimity requirement for acceptance of the payment oﬀer
is not crucial for the result in Proposition 1, and can be replaced, for instance,
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by a simple majority requirement. Further, each supporter may decide only on
the payment oﬀered to him, not on the whole payment vector. The argument
in Proposition 1 holds even if each supporter observes only coordinate ai of
the payment oﬀer that goes to this supporter. In this case, the beliefs about
what other supporters are oﬀered and the beliefs about how they react to these
oﬀers triggers the equilibrium in which all but the “right” payment oﬀers are
rejected. Hence, the mechanism supporting the equilibria in Proposition 1 is
quite general.
Proposition 1 characterizes a large set of subgame perfect equilibria in
the last period. Note, however, that none of the players can choose which
equilibrium is chosen, as the equilibrium is determined by the players’ beliefs
about their co-players’ behavior. For what follows, we will assume that the
players in period T coordinate on an equilibrium in which
a1(T ) = .... = an(T ) = α > 0 and nα < 1. (3)
The property α > 0 is crucial for our analysis, whereas the absolute level of α
is not.
As α = 0 is also an equilibrium, the focus on the equilibrium in (3) needs
some discussion. It needs emphasis here that the equilibria with α > 0 are in-
deed subgame perfect equilibria. But, in addition, they also have some appeal,
and for a number of reasons. First, α can be considered as a smallest possible
unit. If there is a smallest positive unit, then the outcome with payment oﬀers
equal to this smallest possible unit is very plausible even in the absence of the
coordination problem that generates the equilibria with α > 0 as in Propo-
sition 1: the leader may give the supporters strict incentives by which each
strictly prefers acceptance compared to rejecting the payment oﬀer. Second,
and related, α could be some exogenous institutionally required minimum re-
muneration for supporters or some genuine benefit of being a member of the
supporter group that cannot be withdrawn by the leader, so that oﬀers below
α are infeasible. If this minimum is suﬃciently small, it is never a binding
constraint, except for the last period. Third, in a broader context, it is well-
known that, even in the ultimatum game, an extreme oﬀer of zero is rarely
observed, even in the final period, and many reasons have been put forward
for this outcome.10 Fourth, as we think of the governance game as a repeated
game with many periods, we do not want the end-game eﬀect dominate what
10For a number of survey references and preference based theories for this behavior see,
e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Of course, strictly adopting
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happens in much earlier periods. We will focus on the stationary equilibrium
that emerges in the limit case in which T is very large, and, only for the equi-
libria with α > 0 in the final period, does the stationary equilibrium outcome
resemble the infinite horizon outcome and is independent of the end game
eﬀect.
3 The conclave regime
We first consider the conclave regime, solving for the equilibrium in period
T −1, and then backwards. The coordination problem between the supporters
in any given period will generally cause multiple equilibria.
Proposition 2 Suppose players anticipate that the equilibrium in period T
will be described as in Proposition 1, with α > 0. Then
a1(T − 1) = ... = an(T − 1) = aCT−1 =
n− r(n− 1)
n2
δ(1− (n+ 1)α) (4)
characterizes the lowest feasible transfers in period (T−1) in a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which no leadership contest occurs.
Proof. Suppose all j 6= i do not challenge the leader, so that i is pivotal.
Compare supporter i’s payoﬀ from accepting or rejecting the oﬀer. If i accepts
this oﬀer, then i’s payoﬀ is
ai(T − 1) + δα. (5)
If i rejects the oﬀer, i receives 0 in period T − 1 and enters into the contest
for leadership in that period. Accordingly, i’s payoﬀ is
−xi +
(xi)rPh=n
h=1(xh)
r
δ[(1− nα)− α] + δα (6)
where δ[(1−nα)−α] is the present value of the diﬀerence between the leader’s
and a supporter’s income in period T , which is the ’prize’ in the leadership
contest in period T − 1, and δα is the present value of what the supporter
receives in period T if he does not win the leadership contest in period T − 1.
their preference assumptions would also have implications for the equilibrium outcomes in
the periods T − k.
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All supporters choose their own eﬀort xi to maximize (6) simultaneously,
and the equilibrium eﬀorts can be derived from the first-order conditions11 for
maximization of (6) that require
r(xi)r−1
³Ph=n
h=1(xh)
r − (xi)r
´
³Ph=n
h=1(xh)
r
´2 δ[(1− nα)− α] = 1.
Using symmetry, solving for the equilibrium eﬀorts and inserting these in (6)
yields payoﬀs from challenging the leader as
n− r(n− 1)
n2
δ[(1− nα)− α] + δα. (7)
Setting (5) and (7) equal and solving for ai(T − 1) yields aCT−1 as in (4).
Recursively we can determine aCT−k, assuming that the subgame perfect
equilibrium in any continuation game between the current leader and sup-
porters or their respective replacements is characterized by a series of payment
oﬀers (aCT−k+1, ...a
C
T−1, a
C
T ) with a
C
T = α, and unanimous acceptance of these
oﬀers. The condition that makes a supporter in period T − k just indiﬀerent
to whether to accept or to reject an oﬀer of size aCT−k is
aCT−k+
kX
j=1
δjaCT−k+j = 0+
n− r(n− 1)
n2
kX
j=1
δj[(1−(n+1)aCT−k+j]+
kX
j=1
δjaCT−k+j
which reduces to
aCT−k =
n− r(n− 1)
n2
kX
j=1
δj[(1− (n+ 1)aCT−k+j]. (8)
For large k →∞, this value converges to
aC =
n− r(n− 1)
n2 + δn− δn2r + δrδ. (9)
We define aC as the stationary-state-payment in the conclave regime. Note
that it no longer depends on the absolute level of aCT .
11Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) analyze this contest structure more generally and
show that the equilibrium is unique. For symmetry and r ≤ 1, the equilibrium is character-
ized by the first-order conditions.
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We could have established aC also as a Markov perfect equilibrium of an
infinitely repeated game.12 However, the multiplicity of equilibria which can
be supported as Markov perfect equilibria makes this less useful. In contrast,
the argument that started from a finite horizon framework establishes this
payment oﬀer as the lowest payment that can be supported as a subgame
perfect equilibrium without actual leadership contest. For this reason we use
aCT−1 and a
C to consider the comparative static properties of this lowest-
transfers equilibrium and to use it as a benchmark case for comparing it with
the respective lowest-transfers equilibrium in the divide-et-impera regime.
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium that is characterized in proposition 2, the
leader’s share in the total rent in period T − 1 is increasing in n. Further,
limn→∞(1− naC) = 1−δ1−δr .
Proof. The leader’s net share in the governance rent in period T − 1 is 1 −
naCT−1 = 1−(1−rn−1n )(1−(n+1)α). Hence,
∂
∂n(1−naCT−1) =
r(1−α)+αn2(1−r)
n2 δ >
0. Moreover, using (9) and taking limits, lim n→∞(1− naC) = 1−δ1−δr .
The size of the set S is an important determinant for the leader’s share in
the total rent, but the discount factor and the eﬀectiveness of contest eﬀort also
matter. As regards period T−1, the leader benefits from an increase in the set
of supporters. However, considering the steady-state value, the comparative
statics are not monotonic everywhere.
The limit result for the steady-state value suggests that, for r < 1, even
if the number of supporters becomes very large, making it very unlikely that
each of them can become the successor to the incumbent leader, the leader
still needs to pay some fraction of the governance rent to the supporters. Only
if r = 1, the sum of what the leader has to pay to the group of supporters
for their support becomes zero. The logic of this result is as follows. If very
many supporters are competitors for becoming the new leader, their contest
will dissipate a considerable share of the rent. For r = 1, it is known that
the whole rent is dissipated if the number of contestants is very large (Tullock
12Consider an infinite sequence of periods. Suppose that all supporters at a given period
believe that all other supporters will accept a payment oﬀer in any period if, and only if,
this oﬀer is aC in that period, but that at least one supporter will challenge the leader
in this period and in all future periods if a diﬀerent transfer is oﬀered. For these beliefs,
the incumbent leader will never deviate from oﬀering aC , and all incumbent supporters
will always accept aC ; a diﬀerent transfer will never be chosen, and a subgame perfect
equilibrium is established.
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1980). Hence, they do not gain anything from entering into a struggle for
leadership, not even as a group: one of them will win leadership, but the
aggregate contest resources they spend in the struggle approximate, and in
the limit, are equal to the rent from leadership. Accordingly, it is better
to depend on many than to depend on a few, particularly if the supporters
anticipate competition between them if they were to abandon the current
leader.
The choice of n is not endogenized here. One countervailing eﬀect that is
not considered here is that it becomes a diﬃcult practical matter to have a
very large set of supporters each of which is pivotal. Once supporters are not
pivotal, other aspects come into play, such as the possibility of the formation of
subgroups which are pivotal as a subgroup. In the political context of existing
regimes, n is often governed by some constitutional rules. For instance, in
the Roman Catholic Church, the pope needs the permission of the cardinals
if he wants to enlarge their group.13 Proposition 3 gives a possible reason for
this constitutional rule and suggests that compensation must be paid to the
existing group for agreeing to an enlargement.
4 The divide-et-impera regime
Consider now the alternative regime in which the supporters of the incum-
bent leader are unwilling or unable to support this leader’s successor. These
supporters may also remove the incumbent leader, and will then enter into a
contest for who becomes his successor. Their incentives to do this are diﬀerent
in this regime, and this will lead to diﬀerent payments to the supporters which
they are willing to accept.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all players anticipate that the equilibrium in pe-
riod T will be described as in Proposition 1, with α > 0. Then
aD1 (T − 1) = ... = aDn (T − 1) =
n− r(n− 1)
n2
δ[1− nα]− δα ≡ aDT−1 (10)
characterizes the lowest feasible tranfers in period T − 1 in a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which no leadership contest in period T − 1 occurs.
Proof. Compare supporter i’s payoﬀ from accepting or rejecting the oﬀer,
given that all other supporters accept the oﬀer. If i accepts the oﬀer then i’s
13We are grateful to Nuno Garoupa for pointing this out to us.
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payoﬀ is given as in (5). If i rejects the oﬀer, i receives 0 in period T − 1 and
a contest for leadership takes place among the members of S in this period.
The present value of the prize of winning the contest in this case is δ[1− nα],
which is the diﬀerence between what the leader in period T receives according
to Proposition 1, and what i receives in period T if i does not win the contest,
which is zero. Hence, applying the results on the Tullock contest between n
symmetric contestants for a prize of this size, the expected payoﬀ net of contest
eﬀort is n−(n−1)rn2 times the present value δ[1 − nα] of winning the leadership
contest. Equalization of the two payoﬀs yields
aDT−1 + δα =
n− (n− 1)r
n2
δ[1− nα]. (11)
This yields the equilibrium payment oﬀer aDT−1 as in (10).
Consider now the smallest equilibrium transfers aDT−k in previous periods
T − k that constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if the incumbent leader
and all players in S and K consider (aDT−k+1, ..., aDT−1, aDT ) with aDT = α as the
sequence of equilibrium transfers in the subsequent periods. This recursive
procedure yields
aDT−k +
kX
j=1
δjaDT−k+j = 0 +
n− (n− 1)r
n2
kX
j=1
δj[1− naDT−k+j]. (12)
For large k →∞ this value converges to
aD =
δn− δnr + δr
n2 + δrn+ δn2 − δn2r . (13)
and we define this value as the stationary-state-payment in the divide-et-
impera regime.
Consider the comparative statics of the equilibrium transfers in period T−1
and in the stationary state.
Proposition 5 In the subgame perfect equilibrium that is characterized in
Proposition 4, the leader’s share in the total rent in period T − 1 increases
in n and the leader’s steady-state share increases in n. For T → ∞, for
n→∞ the leader keeps the full governance rent if r = 1.
Proof. Note that 1− naDT−1 = 1−
n−r(n−1)
n δ(1− nα) + nδα. Accordingly, the
first derivative of this share with respect to n yields
∂(1−naDT−1)
∂n = δ(2α− rα+
16
r
n2 ), which is positive. For the stationary-state payment note that 1− naD =
n
δn+n−δrn+δr , and
∂
∂n(
n
δn+n−δrn+δr) =
rδ
(−δn−n+δrn−δr)2 > 0. Hence, 1 − na
D
monotonically increases in r, and converges towards 1
1+δ(1−r) for n→∞.
Intuitively, two eﬀects increase the leadership rent if the number of sup-
porters increases. First, if the incumbent leader is challenged, all incumbent
successors lose their rent as supporters, and only one of them becomes the
new leader. The probability of becoming the new leader is smaller for each
successor if the number of current supporters is higher. Hence, because n− 1
supporters lose all rents if the incumbent leader is challenged, they, as a group,
lose some rent if they challenge the leader. However, this eﬀect is not suﬃcient
for the aggregate share of the governance rent to be reduced to zero. This can
be seen most clearly for the case r = 0, i.e., if the successorship is simply at
random. In this case, the share in the rent that must be paid to the group of
supporters is δ
1+δ > 0 if this group is very large.
The increase in n has a second eﬀect. The contest for successorship becomes
more wasteful if the number of potential successors becomes larger. Accord-
ingly, what has to be granted to the group for not replacing the leader becomes
smaller and smaller as the group size of S increases. The limit result in Propo-
sition 5 is also interesting. If eﬀort in the contest for leadership succession is
suﬃciently eﬀective (i.e., if r = 1), the leader receives the full governance rent
in the equilibrium and does not have to share it with his supporters. Again,
the rivalry among potential successors and the contest between them if the
question of successorship emerges reduces what the incumbent must pay to
his supporters to secure his regime.
5 Comparing the two regimes
There is a continuum of equilibria in both regimes. So which equilibria should
be compared? In the analysis we have selected equilibria in period T − 1 in
which the leader stays in power and makes the smallest feasible payments to
the supporters. The equilibria also correspond with each other in the sense
that their continuation games in period T are perfectly identical. Hence, the
only material diﬀerence between the two equilibria in period T − 1 is the
diﬀerence in succession rules as regards the supporters who fail to win the
leadership contest. This makes the two equilibria comparable and we may
ask which regime yields a larger rent to the incumbent leader. As a similar
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reasoning also applies to the construction of the stationary state payments,
and we may also compare aC and aD. The outcome of such a comparison is
stated as
Proposition 6 A comparison of the two regimes yields:
1− naDT−1 > 1− naCT−1
and
1− naD > 1− naC.
Proof. A comparison between aCT−1 and a
D
T−1 yields that a
D
T−1 < a
C
T−1 if
δ(n− r(n− 1))
n2
(1− nα)− δα < δ(n− r(n− 1))
n2
(1− nα− α) (14)
which is true for all n > 1. Further, a comparison between aD and aC using
(9) and (13) yields that aD < aC if
δn− δr(n− 1)
n2 + δn2 + δrn− δn2r <
δn− δr(n− 1)
n2 + δn− δn2r + δr (15)
which holds as both denominators are strictly positive and the denominator
of the left-hand side is bigger than the denominator of the right hand side if
(δn+ δr)(n− 1) > 0, which is true for all n > 1.
Proposition 6 states a result that may seem counter-intuitive, but has a
simple intuition. Although the position as leader is more attractive in the
divide-et-impera regime than in the conclave regime, the supporters in the
divide-et-impera regime are willing to delay the option of becoming a leader
and to continue their support for a smaller compensation than in the conclave
regime. The intuition for this result is as follows. In each regime the leader
has to pay the supporters for their continued support, where the alternative
to continued support is the choice of a new leader from the set of current
supporters. This alternative is more attractive in the conclave regime than
in the divide-et-impera regime. In the conclave regime, the fall-back position
of all supporters in the struggle to become the new leader is to stay on as
supporters of the new leader. What is at stake for each of them in the struggle
for leadership is smaller in the conclave regime, and fewer resources are wasted
in the struggle for leadership.
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Figure 1: Leadership rent 1 − na net of payments to the supporters in the
equilibrium for the two regimes for r = 1. The dotted line depicts the divide-
et-impera regime for δ = 0.9 as functions of the size n of the group S of
supporters.
This implies that the replacement of the current leader by one of the current
supporters is attractive to them, and, in turn, the payments that make them
willing to continue to support the current leader are high. In the divide-et-
impera regime, the supporters get less as a group from replacing the leader.
The leadership position may involve a higher leadership rent in the divide-
et-impera regime, but current supporters lose the rent of being a supporter,
and in the aggregate they gain less than in the conclave regime. Moreover,
because it makes a much larger diﬀerence for a player in the divide-et-impera
regime whether he wins or loses the struggle for leadership, the amount of
resources wasted in this leadership struggle is larger in the divide-et-impera
regime. Both of these aspects make the divide-et-impera regime less attractive
for discontinuing the support for the incumbent leader, and the payment oﬀers
that are acceptable for the incumbent supporters are therefore lower.
Note that the diﬀerence in (14) and in (15) vanish for α = 0. This is
clearly an end-game eﬀect and highlights the importance of proposition 1 and
the focus on an equilibrium in period T with α > 0.
The eﬀect of the regime for the size of the leadership rent is illustrated
in Figure 1 for the stationary state values of payments in which the share
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Figure 2: Stationary state and final periods for r = 1, α = .005, n = 2 and
δ = .9.
(1 − naD) and (1 − naC) is depicted for diﬀerent n for three values of δ for
r = 1. The figure reveals a considerable leadership rent for the incumbent
leader in both regimes, typically larger than half of the total government rent
or more, but the rent is much larger in the divide-et-impera regime (the dotted
line) and approaches almost 100 percent very quickly. The figure also shows
the non-monotonicity of the conclave regime (solid line) for some intermediate
value of n. An increase in δ will generally shift both curves downward, as
it compounds the value of the sacrificed option for becoming a leader in the
struggle for leadership relative to the value of the current payment oﬀer.
It is also interesting to consider the relevance of the values of this stationary
state. Figure 2 illustrates the paths of aCT−k and a
D
T−k for k =∞ and for the last
eleven periods, i.e., for k = 10, 9, ..., 0 for a discount factor δ = 0.9, for r = 1
and for a payment oﬀer in the final round of α = 0.005 and n = 2. Convergence
towards the stationary state occurs fairly quickly, and the stationary state
value is a much better predictor even for T − 2 or T − 1 than the terminal
payment oﬀer α.
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6 The possibility of influence
Thus far we have examined the two regimes in two separate games in which
each regime is expected by all participants to prevail with certainty in all
future periods. What occurs when the participants are uncertain about the
regime that will prevail in the future? And, if there is uncertainty, what if the
leader could influence it in his favor? We deal with these two questions next.
For simplicity we will examine only the last two periods, T and T − 1,
of the finite-period game. In the last period T, by Proposition 1 it does not
matter which regime is expected to prevail by the players. There are multiple
equilibria with the same possible outcomes regardless of regime. Then, the
same range of equilibria would exist regardless of the combinations of (non-
generate) beliefs held by the players regarding which regime would prevail in
that last period. In period T − 1, though, we can expect beliefs to matter. In
particular, suppose that all players believe that the divide-et-impera regime
were to prevail with probability P ∈ [0, 1] and, therefore, that the conclave
regime would prevail with probability 1−P. Furthermore, suppose that these
priors are common knowledge and that all players expect the equilibrium in
the last period T to entail a payment α > 0 by the leader (whoever that
leader is). In period T − 1, the expected payoﬀ of player i in the event of a
leadership contest would then be as follows:
P [−xi+
(xi)rPh=n
h=1(xh)
r
δ(1−nα)]+(1−P ){−xi+ (xi)
rPh=n
h=1(xh)
r
δ[(1−nα)−α]+δα}
(16)
The first-order conditions for maximizing (16) again can be used to determine
the unique symmetric equilibrium eﬀorts as
xi =
r(n− 1)
n2
(δ(1− nα)− (1− P )δα). (17)
Inserting (17) back into (16) yields the expected equilibrium payoﬀ for player
i if the leader D(T − 1) is challenged as
δ
n− r(n− 1)
n2
[1− nα+ (1− P )α] + δα. (18)
If, instead, all players including i accept the amounts oﬀered, i receives
aT−1 + δα.
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The lowest aT−1 that i is willing to accept is, therefore,
aPT−1 ≡ δ
n− r(n− 1)
n2
[1− nα+ (1− P )α].
Note that αPT−1 is decreasing in the prior the players have about the probability
that the succession struggle would follow the rules of the divide-et-impera
regime. Furthermore, αPT−1 is greater than the payment α
D
T−1 the leader would
have to make under the divide-et-impera regime (see (10)) and smaller than
αCT−1, the payment under the conclave regime (see (4)). Of course, when P = 0,
αPT−1 = α
C
T−1 and when P = 1, α
P
T−1 = α
D
T−1. We have therefore shown the
following Proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose players anticipate that the equilibrium in period T
will be described as in Proposition 1, with α > 0. Furthermore, suppose they
have a prior P ∈ [0, 1] concerning the likelihood of the divide-et-impera regime.
Then,
aP1 (T −1) = ... = aPn (T−1) = aPT−1 =
δ(n− r(n− 1)
n2
[1−nα+(1−P )α] (19)
characterizes the lowest feasible transfers in period (T−1) in a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which no leadership contest occurs. In this equilibrium, the
payoﬀ to the leader (1− nαPT−1 + δ(1− nα)) is increasing in the prior P and
is higher than the payoﬀ under the conclave regime and lower than the payoﬀ
under divide-et-impera.
Given that, in the presence of uncertainty about the regime expected to
prevail, the greater the prior probability of divide-et-impera that the players
have, the higher the leader’s payoﬀ is, it would be in the leader’s interest to
induce prior beliefs P as close to 1 as feasible. Perhaps, up to a certain point,
a certain level can be achieved with cheap, costless talk. Another way is to do
this with costly deeds that lock-in, or more moderately, increase the likelihood
of locking in future contestants into the divide-et-impera regime. For example,
Mehmed the Conqueror killed his brothers when he became Sultan and so did
King Ashoka. That was a costly action that did not just reduce the probability
of challenges, but also increased the likelihood that future challengers (the
sons or even members of the aristocracy who could conceivably, if remotely,
could pose a challenge) would have to fight to the death amongst themselves.
Moreover, both Mehmed the Conqueror and Ashoka took additional actions
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to increase the chance of divide-et-impera version — Mehmed by enacting the
fratricide law and Ashoka by making the (presumably costly) visit to hell.
We can thus very simply think of the leader in period T − 1 having the
choice of an action b ∈ [0,∞] that has a cost C(b) (which is increasing and
convex in b) and can influence the prior beliefs of the players so that P = P (b)
(increasing and concave in b). Assuming that the choice of b takes place
before any challenges are possible and any payments can be made, the leader’s
problem would be choose the b that maximizes the leader’s payoﬀ,
1− naPT−1 + δ(1− nα)− C(b).
By the assumptions about P and C, a unique such action b∗ will exist. How
close the (now) posterior P (b∗) is to 1, and therefore how likely is the divide-
et-impera regime, depends on how sensitive the players are to the actions of
the current leader and how convincing these actions can be, and of course how
costly these actions are for the leader. Note that the benefit of this costly
action for the leader within our model does not come from the lower likelihood
of a challenge, since no challenge would occur in equilibrium. The benefit
comes instead from the higher payoﬀ to the leader induced by the greater
belief among the players of the divide-et-impera regime prevailing in the event
of a challenge.
If the leader could take costly actions to change beliefs to his advantage,
could the supporters also take actions that would be to their advantage? We
should not rule out such a possibility. As shown in models by Weingast (1997)
and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) that are better adapted to the
task, institutions like the conclave regime require the collaboration and active
involvement of the supporters as well as the absence of active policies of the
leader that would prevent such collaboration. Or, put diﬀerently, the divide-et-
impera regime is more of a default regime, whereas the conclave regime requires
higher trust, coordination, and other institutional restraints and checks on
powerful leaders; it is easier to break something than to build it. Thus, it is
conceivable that the supporters could shift the posteriors in their favor but
that can be expected to be costlier for them than it would be for the leader.
Still, such a regime shift has happened from the early stages of feudalism to its
late stages and a number of eﬀects might have made this possible. How this
could happen is an interesting and perhaps central issue — very much related
to the emergence of modern governance out of autocracy — but it would lead
us too far afield for the objectives of this paper.
23
7 Discussion
In this paper we compared two principles governing the rules of succession,
asking what are the implications of rivalry among supporters of an incumbent
leader for their rents from overthrowing the incumbent leader, and what conse-
quences does this, in turn, have for the relationship between incumbent leaders
and their supporters. In case of a replacement of the incumbent leader by one
of his supporters, the other supporters of the former leader may, but need not
be able to credibly act as supporters of the new leader. This distinguishes
two regimes which we called divide-et-impera and conclave regime. We show
that rivalry among supporters shifts a considerable share of governance rents
from the group of supporters to the leader. Intuitively, much more is at stake
for supporters in the case of a leadership change if the group of supporters is
completely replaced than if the old supporters stay on under the new leader-
ship, particularly for those who do not become the new leader. This makes
the group of possible successors fight harder in the struggle for leadership,
and this makes it less interesting for supporters to enter into such a struggle.
Accordingly, the leader does not have to pay them much to prevent them from
challenging his leadership.
We discussed an endogenous choice of the regime. Given the diﬀerence in
the allocation of rents, it is clear that a leader who can, to some extent, choose
his supporters, may want to choose the divide-et-impera regime.
Many aspects are important for establishing this regime. In the introduc-
tion we discussed costly actions that may help install some institutional rules.
An incumbent leader may also choose new supporters that consist of groups
which already are in conflict with existing supporters. At least in the business
world, but also in politics, leaders sometimes build up a ‘crown prince’, and
possibly even more frequently, several of them, narrowing down the group of
likely successors to a small number, but inducing strong rivalry between the
members of this group. Moreover, leaders may design institutions and allocate
the duties of supporters in a way such that their competencies may overlap and
are not well designed, or choose other institutional arrangements that induce
fighting between the groups.
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